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Sense   and   life:   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   philosophy   of   nature   and   evolutionary  
biology•  
  




1.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  and  biology  
  
1.1  Phenomenology  and  the  experimental  sciences  
  
It  seems  widely  accepted  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  was  the  phenomenologist  who  
engaged  most  directly  and  seriously  with   the  empirical  sciences,  specifically  
psychology   and   biology.1  There   are   good   grounds   for   this   assertion.   In   his  
first  major  work,  The  Structure  of  Behaviour,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   investigation  of  
the   relations   between   consciousness   and   nature   deals   extensively   with  
empirical  psychology  and  to  a   lesser  extent,  biology.  Already  in  this  text,  he  
grapples  with  the  same  problem  that  will  concern  the  lectures,  notes  and  texts  
that  he  was  working  on  at  the  end  of  his  life:  
  
And   once   the   criticism   of   realistic   analysis   and   causal   thinking   has  
been   made,   is   there   nothing   justified   in   the   naturalism   of   science—
nothing  which  “understood”  and  transposed,  ought  to  find  a  place  in  
transcendental  philosophy.  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  1963,  p.  4)  
  
What  will  have  changed  in  the  period  between  The  Structure  of  Behaviour  and  
the   courses   in   the   late   fifties   and   early   sixties   at   the  Collège   de   France   is   the  
concept   of   nature   that   the   philosopher   is   working   with.   In   the   former,  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   begins   by   defining   nature   as   the   “multiplicity   of   events  
external   to  each  other  and  bound   together  by   relations  of   causality.”  By   the  
time  of  the  lectures  on  the  concept  of  nature  at  the  Collège  de  France  Merleau-­‐‑
                                                
•   The   author   would   like   to   thank   Rudolf   Bernet   and   Francesco   Tava   for   their  
comments  on  earlier  versions  of  this  paper.  Any  errors  or  omission  are  obviously  my  
own  –  DM.  
1  Setting  aside  the  question  of  whether  someone  like  Ernst  Mach  or  Gilbert  Simondon  
was  a  phenomenologist.    
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Ponty   has   understood   that   in   order   to   understand   the   dynamic   of  
consciousness   in   nature,   he   will   have   to   attempt   to   rethink   the   concept   of  
nature.          
  
The   engagement   with   the   sciences   continues   after   the   Second   World   War.  
Large   portions   of  Phenomenology   of  Perception   involve   engagement  with   and  
close  analysis  of  Kurt  Goldstein’s  work  in  Gestalt  psychology  as  well  as  other  
psychological  theories  contemporary  with  the  book.  In  his  later  lectures  at  the  
Collège  de  France,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  examines  the  work  of  several  biologists  and  
ethologists   in   the   course   of   working   toward   the   development   of   his   own  
ontology   of   nature,   a   project   that  was   in   progress   at   the   time   of   his   death.  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   status   as   the   phenomenologist   friendly   to   the   sciences,   in  
contrast  to  Husserl’s  apparent  anti  scientific-­‐‑realism  and  Heidegger’s  critique  
of  the  sciences  for  lacking  adequate  grounding  in  the  question  of  being,2  has  
been  reinforced  after  the  fact  by  the  recent  uptake  of  his  work  on  perception  
and   embodiment   by   the   empirically   friendly   fields   of   cognitive   science   and  
still  more  recently  enactivist  theory  of  cognition  (e.g.  Thompson  2010).    
  
It  has  not  all  been  smooth  sailing   in   the  relation  between  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  or  
better  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   scholarship,   and   the   sciences.   In   the   rush   to   build   an  
amicable   entente   with   the   powerful   explanatory   efficacy   of   the   empirical  
sciences  it  is  sometimes  forgotten  that  much  of  Phenomenology  of  Perception   is  
devoted  to  a  critique  of  the  empirical  sciences,  specifically  for  an  inability  to  
comprehend  their  own  results,  and  this  is  a  theme  that  continues  throughout  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   work.   Thomas   Baldwin   has   recently   examined   Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s   critique   of   the   natural   sciences   in   Phenomenology   of   Perception   and  
argued   that   it   is   ultimately   unconvincing,   parochial,   and   even   at   points  
misinformed  (Baldwin  2013).  
  
When   one   examines   closely  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   engagement  with   the   sciences  
what  becomes  clear  is  that  he  has  a  specific  appreciation  for  psychology  and  
biology   in   particular   when   these   sciences   behave   in   a   fashion   amenable   to  
phenomenology.  That  is,  when  they  can  be  interpreted  in  such  a  manner  as  to  
allow   explanatory   room   for   the   primacy   of   the   transcendental   field   of  
                                                
2   It   is   important   to   note   that   neither   Husserl   not   Heidegger   were   crude   anti-­‐‑
naturalists   as   they   are   sometimes   characterised   as   being.  What   both   objected   to   in  
their  respective  criticisms  of  naturalism  was  a  crude  physicalism.    
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perception  as  a  field  of  sense  and  most  importantly  of  latency  or  potentiality.  
This   is   particularly   the   case   in   relation   to   Phenomenology   of   Perception.  
Goldstein’s  emphasis,   for  example,  on   the   functional  primacy  of  meaningful  
relations  over  mechanisms  fits  perfectly  with  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  own  thesis,  but  
is   grounded   in   neurology   not   phenomenology   (Goldstein   1995,   especially  
chapter  6).    
  
Similarly,  in  the  Nature  lectures  given  between  1956  and  1960  at  the  Collège  de  
France,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   biological   interlocutors   are   in   large   part   ethologists  
studying   animal   behaviour   (Portmann   and   Lorenz)   or   philosophically  
inclined  biologists  who  were  deeply  suspicious  of  the  claims  to  causal  closure  
in  biology  made  by  mechanistic  philosophy  (Jakob  von  Uexküll,  Hans  Dreisch,  
E.S.  Russell);  biologists,   in  other  words,  who  would  have  endorsed   the  now  
relatively   uncontroversial   claim   that   explanations   in   biology   cannot   be  
reduced   to   explanations   in   physics   and   chemistry   (e.g.   Mayr   1985).   What  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   appreciates   in   the  biologists   that   he   refers   to   approvingly   in  
his  studies  is  the  primacy  of  a  field  of  meaningful  relations  over  mechanism,  
and  the  amenability  of  their  experimental  results  to  supporting  such  a  thesis.      
  
That  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  took  this  attitude  and  approach  toward  the  biology  of  his  
day  should  not  be  surprising.   It,   in   large  part,   takes   its   leave  from  Husserl’s  
own  attitude  toward  biology  in  its  relation  to  transcendental  phenomenology.  
Husserl,  who  corresponded  with  both  von  Uexküll  and  Driesch,  writes  in  the  
twenty-­‐‑third   appendix   to   the  Crisis   text   that   biology   not   only   proceeds   by  
way  of  a  form  of  empathy  (Einfu ̈hlung),  an  idea  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  repeats  in  
the  Nature   lectures,   but   also   that   biology   is   the   empirical   science   closest   to  
transcendental  phenomenology  in  both  its  aims  and  methodology3  due  to  the  
fact   that   biology   (properly   understood)   is   devoted   to   the   theoretical  
elaboration   of   the   originary   sense   formation   (ursprünglichen   Sinnbildung)   of  
the  lifeworld  (Husserl,  2013,  p.  8).  The  idea  of  biology  as  closely  related  to,  or  
a   pathway   into   the   universal   science   of   sense   formation   was   not   one   that  
Husserl  was  alone  in  holding.  Jakob  von  Uexküll  provides  a  similar  definition  
                                                
3  “Biology’s  proximity  to  the  sources  of  evidence  (Quellen  der  Evidenz)  grants  it  such  a  
proximity  to  the  depths  of  the  things  themselves  (Tiefen  der  Sachen),  that  its  access  to  
transcendental  philosophy  should  be  the  easiest  and  with  it   the  access  to  the  true  a  
priori   to  which   the  world   of   living   beings   refers,   in   its   greatest   and  most   constant  
generalities  which   cannot  be   captured  without  question   in   their   a  priori  nature   (as  
unconditionally  universal  and  necessary)”  (Husserl  2013,  p,  7).    
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of  biology  in  distinction  from  physiology,  which  was  concerned  with  organic  
mechanism  in  his  Theoretische  Biologie  (1920),  a  position  further  elaborated  in  
Streifzüge  durch  die  Umwelten  von  Tieren  und  Menschen  (1934),  where  he  argues  
that   philosophy   of   biology  must   take   seriously   the   perceptions   and   indeed  
perceptual   meaning-­‐‑worlds   of   non   human   animals,   without   insisting   that  
animals  all  have  conscious  relations  to  their  worlds.  A  similar  understanding  
of  biology  as  being  concerned  with  meaningful  behavioural  relations  between  
organic  systems  and  environments  can  also  be  found  in  Kurt  Goldstein’s  Der  
Aufbau   des   Organismus   (1934).   All   of   these   approaches   seem   to   point   to   a  
special   relation   between   life   and   sense-­‐‑formation:   sense-­‐‑formation   is   the  
domain  of  life,  or  put  otherwise,  life  makes  sense  –  a  claim  that  we  also  find  in  
George  Canguilhem’s  work.4  This  explains  why  Husserl  thought  of  biology  as  
a   universal   science   (like   physics)   and   not   one   that   would   necessarily   be  
constrained   by   the   known   conditions   of   earthly   biology,   “membrane-­‐‑based  
cellularity,   semi-­‐‑conservative   DNA/RNA-­‐‑mediated   self-­‐‑replication,   protein-­‐‑
regulated   metabolism,   Darwinian   evolution,   non-­‐‑equilibrium   energization”  
(Mann   2013,   p,   155),   but   rather   the   invariant   and   eidetic   transcendental  
conditions  of  sense  formation.    
  
1.2  Behaviour  and  Latency  
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   interest   in  biology  as   relevant   to  his   attempts   to  develop  a  
philosophy  of  nature  that  would  serve  as  a  way  into  ontology  is  down  to  two  
fundamental  concepts:  behaviour  and  latency.  Where  he  praises  the  work  of  
experimental   and   theoretical   biologists   it   is   because   he   sees   their   work   as  
emphasizing   the   importance   of   these   two   ideas,   which   are   arguably   the  
cornerstones  of  his  entire  philosophical  edifice.  Thus  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  praise  
of  certain  experimental  biologists  stands  in  relief  from  his  critique  of  what  he,  
following   Bergson,   calls   the   “ultra-­‐‑mechanism”   of   “Neo-­‐‑Darwinism   in   its  
most   developed   forms,”   which   fittingly   he   thinks   ignores   completely   the  
significance   of   behaviour   and   latency.   The   examination   of   behaviour   at  
various   organic   levels,   embryology   and   morphology,   instinct   and   complex  
response   to   environmental   stimulus   and   also   problems   of   phylogenesis,  
                                                
4  Cf.  “To  define  life  as  a  meaning  inscribed  in  matter  is  to  acknowledge  the  existence  
of  an  a  priori  objective  that  is  inherently  material  and  not  merely  formal.  […]  If  life  is  
the  production,  transmission  and  reception  of  information,  then  clearly  life  involves  
both  conservation  and  innovation.”  (Canguilhem,  1994,  p.  317-­‐‑19)    
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which  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  discusses  briefly,  tantalizingly  telling  his  listeners  “put  
the   very   fabric   of   being   in   question,”   is   part   of   the   broader   and   also  
unelaborated  argument  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  makes  in  the  Résumé  of  his  third  
course  on  the  concept  of  Nature  at  the  Collège  de  France   (“Nature  and  Logos:  
The   Human   Body”)   concerning   “a   scalar   structure   of   reality”   containing   a  
“plurality   of   space-­‐‑time   levels”   and   “‘organo-­‐‑formative’   territories   which  
impinge  on  one  another  and  possess  a  periphery  beyond   their   focal   region”  
such   that   “organisms   and   types  would   appear   as   ‘traps   for   fluctuation,’   as  
‘patterned   jumbles,’   and   as   variants   of   a   sort   of   ‘phenomenal   topology’  
without   any  break  with   chemical,   thermodynamic   and   cybernetic   causation”  
(Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  1970,  p.   126-­‐‑28).  What   is  very   important   to  emphasize  here,  
and   what   is   consistent   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   repeated   claim   that   scientists  
often  overlook  the  significance  of  their  results,  is  the  insistence  that  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s  ontology  of  Nature  is  inflationary  and  does  not  break  –  in  the  sense  of  
discard  or  seek   to   refute  –  with  scientifically  established   forms  of  causation,  
but   seemingly   seeks   to   give   them   an   added   “dimensionality”   that   would  
allow  for  a  fuller  explanation  of  phenomena  than  the  current  model  provides.  
The  dynamics  of  this  expanded  ontology  of  nature  can  and  should,  according  
to   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   be   explained   in   terms   of   behaviour,   and   specifically   in  
terms  of  meaningful  relations.    
  
A   first   step   toward   the   development   of   this   new   ontology   is   the  
particular   emphasis   on   the   whole   organism   as   the   irreducible   unit   of  
behaviour.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  takes  over  and  shares  this  idea  with  Goldstein,  but  
also  Russell   and  Canguilhem  –   the   shared  affinity   to   the  work  of  Goldstein  
and   von   Uexküll   is   an   under-­‐‑explored   bridge   between  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   and  
Canguilhem   and   between   phenomenology   and   French   epistemology   more  
generally.   The   primary   level   of   behaviour   is   the   dynamic   of   meaningful  
relations   between   an   organism   and   its   environment,   this   and   not   reflex   or  
molecular   mechanism   subsequently   becomes   the   focal   point   of   biological  
inquiry.  This   is  precisely  what  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  approves  of  and  why  he   sees  
biology  as  a  way  into  ontology  insofar  as  its  results  point  toward  a  privileged  
manifestation   of   the   intertwining   of   the   visible   and   the   invisible,   or,   put  
otherwise,   matter   and   sense,   and   hence   a   way   out   of   the   bifurcation   that  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  struggled  with  his  entire  career,  that  between  empiricism  and  
idealism   or   as   he   puts   it   elsewhere,   the   “realist-­‐‑causal”   order   and   the  
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“idealist-­‐‑constituting”  order  of  motivation.5  The  study  of  behaviour  in  living  
systems   thus  gives  access   to  what  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  elsewhere   calls   “a   type  of  
being   other   than   the   one   where   what   we   call   ‘matter,’   ‘spirit,’   and   reason  
reside,”   the   disclosure   and   analysis   of   which   was   the   aim   of   his   late  
ontological  project:    
  
The  goal   is  φύύσις  –  λόόγος  –  History   […]  Unconcealment  of  a   type  of  
being   other   than   the   one   where   what   we   call   matter,”   “spirit,’   and  
reason   reside.  We   are   in   contact  with   this   type   of   being   through   our  
science  and  our  private  and  public   lives.  But   it  does  not  have  official  
existence:  our  “philosophical”  thought  remains  spiritualist,  materialist,  
rationalist   or   irrationalist,   idealist   or   realist  when   it   is   not   in   silence.  
(Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  1996,  p.  37)  
  
This   line  of   thought   is  of  course  the  beginning  of  a  research  programme  not  
its  conclusion.  The  emphasis  on  behaviour  and  the  ontological  priority  of  the  
whole   organism   over   and   against   a   reductionist   programme   posits   (among  
others)   the   question   of   biological   individuation   from   a   milieu   or   ecology.6  
How  are  we  to  understand  the  processes  or  dynamics  of   individuation  such  
that   we   can   at   some   point   make   reference   to   the   ontological   and   not   only  
epistemological   primacy   of   the   whole   organism?   Similarly,   if   the   organism  
must   be   thought   of   in   terms   of   its   behavioural   repertoire,   which   emerges  
neither  purely  on  the  side  of  the  organism  nor  the  environment,  how  do  we  
segregate   or   distinguish   the  whole   organism   from   a   set   of   interrelated   and  
interdependent  functions  that  emerge  within  the  dynamics  of  the  ecosystem?  
                                                
5  Cf.   “Biology   thus   has   an   ontological   scope,   it   does   not   teach   us   only   about   local  
region  of  being  (terrestrial  and  limited,  on  the  earth  itself  to  a  canton).  It  has  the  same  
Welt   allgemeinheit   as   physics.   It   has   its   descriptive   Weltlichkeit,   which   is   one   of  
historical   being   […].”   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   1996,   p.   90).   This   could   be   a   paraphrase   of  
Husserl.   On   the   “realist-­‐‑causal”   and   “idealist-­‐‑constituting”   orders   as   two  
“correlative  aspects  of  being”  see  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  1990,  p.  92.    
6  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  lists  the  problem  of  delineating  the  organism  from  its  milieu  as  one  
of  the  ideas  that  modifies  Darwinian  philosophy  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  2003).  A  discussion  
of  this  problem  also  takes  place  in  the  lecture  notes  on  “Animality:  The  Tendencies  of  
Modern  Biology”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  pp.  147-­‐‑  151).  An  organism  has  traditionally  
been  understood  as  an  “autonomous  cell  or  group  of  coordinated  cells  with  the  same  
genome.”   Metagenomic   studies   as   well   as   the   aforementioned   discovery   of   the  
importance  of  the  human  microbiome  have  called  into  question  this  narrow  genome-­‐‑
centric  understanding  of  the  organism  in  favour  of  more  functional  understandings.        
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In   other  words,   can  we  make   a   satisfactory   ontological   distinction   between  
ecology  and  organism,  and  not  just  an  epistemological  one?  In  the  terms  that  I  
cited  earlier  how  do  we  isolate  “‘organo-­‐‑formative’  territories  which  impinge  
on   one   another   and   possess   a   periphery   beyond   their   focal   region”   and  
“organisms   and   types”   that   “appear   as   ‘traps   for   fluctuation’”   into   discrete  
entities?   The   epistemological   problem   of   delineating   the   organism   within  
ecological   dynamics   seems   for   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   to   mark   out   the   path   from  
epistemology   to   ontology.   A   concrete   instance   of   this   question   that   is  
currently   enjoying   attention   is  whether   a  distinction   can   be  drawn  between  
the  isolated  human  organism  and  the  microbiome  that  not  only  helps  sustain  
the  life  of  the  human  organism,  but  has  been  shown  to  play  an  important  role  
in   nearly   all   the   vital   functions   of   the   “human   organism”   including   gene  
expression  (see,  e.g.  Hooper  and  Gordon  2001).    
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  and  Canguilhem’s  student  Gilbert  Simondon  already  points  a  
way  into  this  labyrinth  of  problems  by  emphasizing  the  hylomorphic  error  of  
focusing   on   the   unit   of   individuation,   the   individuated   thing,   rather   than  
examining  and  giving  priority  to  the  process  of  individuation  itself  in  which  
individuals  manifest  as  stable  configurations  of  processes.7  Bringing  this  back  
                                                
7  “The  reality  of  being  as  an  individual  may  be  approached  in  two  ways:  either  via  a  
substantialist   path  whereby   being   is   considered   as   consistent   in   its   unity,   given   to  
itself,   founded   upon   itself,   not   created,   resistant   to   that   which   it   is   not;   or   via   a  
hylomorphic  path,  whereby  the  individual  is  considered  to  be  created  by  the  coming  
together  of  form  and  matter.  The  self-­‐‑centred  monism  of  substantialism  is  opposed  to  
the   bipolarity   of   the   hylomorphic   schema.  However,   there   is   something   that   these  
two  approaches  to  the  reality  of  the  individual  have  in  common:  both  presuppose  the  
existence   of   a   principle   of   individuation   that   is   anterior   to   the   individuation   itself,  
one   that  may  be  used   to  explain,  produce,  and  conduct   this   individuation.  Starting  
from   the   constituted   and   given   individual,   an   attempt   is  made   to   step   back   to   the  
conditions   of   its   existence.   This   manner   of   posing   the   problem   of   individuation-­‐‑-­‐‑
starting   from   the   observation   of   the   existence   of   individuals—conceals   a  
presupposition  that  must  be  examined,  because  it  entails  an  important  aspect  for  the  
proposed  solutions  and  slips   into   the  search   for   the  principle  of   individuation.   It   is  
the   individual,  as  a  constituted   individual,   that   is   the   interesting  reality,   the   reality  
that  must  be  explained.  The  principle  of  individuation  will  be  sought  as  a  principle  
capable   of   explaining   the   characteristics   of   the   individual,   without   a   necessary  
relation  to  other  aspects  of  being  that  could  be  correlatives  of   the  appearance  of  an  
individuated   reality.   Such   a   research   perspective   gives   an   ontological   privilege   to   the  
constituted  individual.  It  therefore  runs  the  risk  of  not  producing  a  true  ontogenesis-­‐‑-­‐‑
that   is,   of   not   placing   the   individual   into   the   system   of   reality   in   which   the  
individuation  occurs”  (Simondon  2009,  p.  4).      
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to  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  analysis  of  ethology  and  developmental  biology,  what   is  
relevant   here   is   the   claim   that   these   two   sciences   are   revelatory   of   an  
ontological   field   characterized   by   processes   of   individuation   and  
generalization.                          
  
This   “type   of   being,”   which   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   believed   the   developmental  
biologists  and  ethologists  he  refers  to  were  in  “contact”  with,  is  characterized  
by  the  primacy  of  latency  over  and  above  actuality.  Latency  can  be  introduced  
with   two   propositions:   (1)   potentiality   precedes   actuality   or   is   the   first  
actuality;  and  (2)  in  a  nonlinear  system  the  antecedent(s)  is  not  exhausted  by  
the   consequent(s)   in   the   dynamics   of   the   system.   In   this   understanding   a  
linear   system  would  most   likely  be  understood   as   an   extremely   stable  non-­‐‑
linear  system  or  as  an  abstraction  from  a  more  encompassing  set  of  non-­‐‑linear  
dynamics.  It  is  important  to  specify  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  emphasis  on  latency  
over   actuality   refers   to   an   indeterminate   latency   that   properly   is   prior   to  
actuality,  not  to  an  actuality  that  is  latent  in  the  sense  of  not-­‐‑yet.  Rather  than  
actuality  being  the  first  latency,  latency  is  the  first  actuality.  This  formulation  
redrafts   ontological   difference:   “there   is   more   to   Being   than   beings  
exemplify.”8      
  
The   terms   latency   and   potentiality   have   both   been   used   in   the   preceding  
paragraph.  To  my  knowledge  both  appear  in  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  corpus  and  no  
systematic   effort   is   made   to   separate   them   out.   A   standard   explanation   of  
their   difference   is   that  what   is   latent   can   be   expected   to   become  manifest   –  
latency   is   the   waiting   room   of   actuality.   Potentiality   holds   no   such  
pretensions.  However  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  deployment  of  the  term  latency  seems  
to   throw   this   distinction   into   some   disarray.   Latency  may   be   said   to   differ  
from   potentiality   if   we   understand   the   latter   in   a   “raw”   sense.   Latency   is  
something   like   potentiality   that   has   a   stylized   developmental   trajectory,  
meaning   that   it   is   individuated   –   cooked   or   conditioned   and   limited   by   its  
environment.   Potentiality   then   goes   from   being   a   domain   of   being,   or   non-­‐‑
sensically,  a  domain  of  partial  or  quasi-­‐‑being  to  being  a  properly  ontological  
term:   potentiality   is   general   un-­‐‑stylised   being   (I   think   that   there   is   a  
connection   here   to   Simondon’s   notion   of   “pre-­‐‑individual   fields”).   Stylised  
fields,  or  perhaps  better   flows,  of   latency  are  marked  by  their  developmental  
orientation,  which  remains  just  that,  an  orientation  not  a  determination;  hence  
                                                
8  I  am  grateful  to  Iain  Hamilton  Grant  for  this  phrasing.  
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Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   continued   references   to   “watermarks.”   Not   forgetting   that  
we   are   dealing   here  with   a   phenomenological   ontology,   latency   is   perhaps  
best   understood   in   terms   of   powers   of   manifestation.   This   description  
radically  alters  the  relation  between  potentiality,  latency  and  actuality.  Rather  
than   latency  qua  stylized  potentiality  being  a  distinct  domain  of  being   from  
actuality,   or   worse,   somehow   less   than   actual,   a   weak   form   of   actuality,  
actuality  must  now  come  to  be  thought  as  a  region  of  potentiality  and  even  of  
latency.  The   actual(s)   are  metastable   configurations   (or   structural   stabilities)  
of  flows  of  latency.  This  is  precisely  why  when  a  metastable  configuration  or  
field  moves   from   one   state   to   another   (behaviour)   the   flow   of   latency   that  
envelops   this   change   is  not   exhausted   –   the   antecedent   flow(s)   of   latency   is  
not   exhausted   by   the   metastable   configuration(s)   that   is   consequent   of   its  
dynamics.    
  
What  I  have  said  in  the  preceding  paragraph  is  obviously  a  very  rough  sketch  
of   an   ontology   that   changes   the   traditionally   conceived   relations   between  
potentiality   and   actuality.   I   introduce   this   here   because   it   is   necessary   to  
understand   how   and   why   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   reads   the   biologists   that   he  
discusses  and  why  he  continually  returns  to  the  ideas  of  latency  and  style  in  
these  readings.    
  
It   is   the   emphasis   on   latency   that   draws  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   to   Goldstein’s   and  
Russell’s   respective   whole   organism   neurology   and   developmental   biology  
(as  well  as  Lorenz’s  ethology,  which  we  will  discuss  in  the  second  part  of  the  
paper).  Both  held  the  idea  that  the  ontological  unity  of  the  organism  cannot  be  
analysed  in  terms  of  its  component  mechanisms  or  parts  wherein  some  form  
of   causal   closure   could   be   seen   to   apply   without   “loss,”   that   is   without  
reducing   the  organism  to  something  “abstract  and  unreal”   (Russell,  1930,  p.  
147;  as  cited  in  Robert,  2004,  p.  69).  What  decomposition  of  behaviour  either  
in   embryonic   development   or   in   the   interaction   between   a   fully   developed  
organism   and   its   environment   misses   out   is   precisely   the   latency   that   is  
always  present  in  behaviour.  Insisting  on  the  phenomenal  presence  of  latency  
in   behaviours,   including   morphogenesis,   also   upturns   the   conventional  
understanding   of   latency   as   not   evident   and   not   active.   In   the   new  
understanding,   latency   must   be   understood   as   both   evident   (visible)   and  
active.  The  problem  up   till   now,   according   to  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   has  been   that  
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most   biologists   tend   to   ignore   what   they   are   unable   to   account   for   in  
reductionist  models  of  nature,  but  what  nonetheless  may  be  apparent.      
  
For  Goldstein   as  well   as   for  Canguilhem   the  necessity  of   a  whole  organism  
approach   and   implicitly   the   contention   that   antecedent   is   not   exhausted   by  
the   consequent   in   behaviour   is   clear   from   how   an   organism   responds   to  
various  demands  from  its  environment.  As  Canguilhem  (1994)  states,  normal  
function  is  in  fact  the  capacity  to  be  able  to  adapt  to  multiple  norms,  i.e.  to  be  
able   to   respond   to   varying   demands   occurring  within   and   emanating   from  
various   sets   of   environmental   constraints   in   a   fashion   conducive   to   the  
continuing  flourishing  of  the  organism.  The  constraints  on  behaviour  have  to  
do  with  the  body  of  the  organism  as  well  as  its  surroundings.  Depending  on  
the   various   constraints,   the   organism   responds   to   demands   from   its  
environment   in   various   ways.   The   response   is   not   a   fixed   mechanism   but  
rather   proceeds   from   an   environmentally   constrained   reserve   of   latency  
towards   actualized   behaviour   or   movement.   That   the   actual   behaviour   of  
movement  does  not   exhaust   the   latency   from  which   it   springs   is   evident   in  
the  fact   that   the  movement  or  response  to  an  environmental  demand  differs  
under   varying   ecological   and   bodily   conditions.   Similar   stimuli   in   different  
contexts   evoke   different   behavioural   responses,   indicating   a   relation   that   is  
more   akin   to   a   conversation   than   a   reflex  or  mechanism.  Hence  Goldstein’s  
insistence,  which  Canguilhem  builds  on,   that   it   is  an  error   to   look   for  either  
the   pathology   or   its   symptom   in   specific   mechanisms.   Rather   what   is  
pathological  and  can  be  described  in  terms  of  symptoms  is  incapacity  on  the  
part  of  the  organism  to  respond  in  an  adequate  fashion  to  the  demands  of  its  
environment.  Latency  while  preceding  actuality  and  not  being  exhausted  by  it  
is  nonetheless  continuously  constrained  and  conditioned  by  it.    
  
Russell  makes  similar  observations,  not  concerning  the  plasticity  of  behaviour  
but   rather   the   stability  of  development   in   relation   to   embryogenesis  despite  
varying   environmental   conditions.   In   The   Interpretation   of   Development   and  
Heredity  he  writes:  “if  the  conditions  do  not  permit  a  straightforward  normal  
development,  if  for  instance  the  developing  organism  suffers  deformation  or  
loss  of  parts,   it  has   to   a   considerable  degree   the  power  of   so  modifying   the  
course  of  its  development  as  to  cope  with  the  unusual  situation,  replacing  for  
example  the  missing  parts”  (Russell  1930,  p.  7).  Despite  language  that  might  
suggest  different,  Russell   is  careful   to  avoid  recourse   to  agency  or  entelechy  
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within  the  process  of  development,  criticizing  the  “gene  theorists”  of  his  time  
for  proposing  a  “material  entelechy”  in  the  germ  plasm  and  also  insisting  that  
the  developing  organism  only  act  as  if  it  were  fulfilling  an  end  or  purpose.9    
  
Interpreting   Russell   via   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   the   explanation   for   how   an  
organism   can   stay   developmentally   oriented   toward   a   species-­‐‑typical   form  
despite  varying  environmental  obstacles  and  constraints  does  not  have  to  do  
with   an   entelechy   within   the   germ   plasm   or   genome   or   other   appeals   to  
various  forms  of  finalism,  but  rather  is  a  case  of  an  indeterminate  yet  oriented  
path  of  development  that  is  latently  present.  Latency  does  not  then  become  an  
invisible  magical  power  but  is  in  fact  a  visible  phenomenon,  in  filigree  (to  use  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  term).  For  Russell,  this  is  part  and  parcel  of  his  insistence  on  
“accepting   the   observed   facts   of   development”   and   not   allowing   a  
methodological   recourse   to   the   artificialism  of   abstraction,  which  he   argued  
was   unable   to   account   for   the   phenomena   of   development   –   a   claim   that  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  would  have   surely   appreciated   insofar   as   it   is   in   the  vein  of  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   own   contention   that   the   scientists   often  do  not  understand  
what   they   are   looking   at,   or   limit   themselves   conceptually   due   of   self-­‐‑
imposed  epistemological  restrictions.  
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   of   course   agrees   that   the   primacy   of   the   whole  
organism   is  an  observable  phenomenon,  not  only   in   its  actual  movement  or  
behaviour  but  also  in  its  developmental  and  behavioural  latency,  which  again  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   says   is   visible   in   filigree,   as   a   watermark,   in   the   style   of   the  
organism’s   movement.   Referring   back   to   Russell’s   interest   in   how   the  
organism,   under   widely   varying   environmental   constraints   and   input,  
develops  according  to  a  species-­‐‑typical  form,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  remarks  that  the  
being  of  a  species  is  a  watermark,  and  perhaps  even  more  mysteriously  that  
styles,  which  give  to  the  watermarks  their  sense,  are  the  modality  of  evolution.  
In  this  sense  when  we  speak  of   the  whole  organism,   it   is   important  to   insist  
that   actuality   does   not   exhaust   the   wholeness   of   the   organism.   The   latent  
visibility   is  not  a  visibility   in  principle,  e.g.  all   that  will  have  been  visible   in  
retrospect  upon  the  organism’s  death.  Rather,  the  insistence  of  the  visibility  in  
filigree  of  latency  gives  a  new  sense  to  the  visible  altogether.  It  is  this  sense  of  
                                                
9  See  Robert  (2004,  pp.  68,  70).  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  actually  seems  to  misread  Russell  and  
attributed  the   idea  of  a  “material  entelechy”  to  him.  Russell   is  objecting  to  what  he  
sees  as  the  “gene  theorists”  taking  the  germ-­‐‑plast  as  a  “material  entelechy.”    
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being   visible   in   filigree   that   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   credits   the   developmental  
biologists  and  ethologists  with  discovering.  This  is  precisely  the  “new  type  of  
being”  that  he  refers  to.  It  is  a  type  of  being  that  he  thinks  the  neo-­‐‑Darwinians  
cannot  recognize,  despite  their  own  contact  with  it.10    
        
Latency,   which   orients   an   organism   in   its   development   toward   a   species-­‐‑
typical  form,  is  visible  in  the  fashion  that  the  organism  responds  to  obstacles  
and   remains   on   its   orientation   toward   that   form.   But   precisely   because   the  
organism   responds   to   obstacles   in   a   fashion   that   cannot   be   accounted   for  
mechanically  under   the   constraints  of   causal   closure  without   the   loss  of   the  
explanandum   this  orientation  cannot  be  described  in  terms  of  a   fixed  track  of  
development.   Latency,   visible   in   the   developmental   trajectory   and   best  
described  as  constrained-­‐‑potentiality  as  opposed   to  a  pure  or  unconstrained  
potentiality,  is  also  the  paradigmatic  example  of  what  it  means  to  talk  about  
the   “visibility   of   the   invisible”   –   explaining   precisely   why   a   philosophy   of  
nature   that  passes   through  developmental  biology  was   for  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  a  
propaedeutic  to  ontology.    
  
  
2.  The  EES  and  the  new  ontology.                                                      
  
2.1  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  critique  of  Neo-­‐‑Darwinism  
  
For   precisely   the   same   reasons   that   he   is   enthusiastic   about   developmental  
biology   and   ethology,   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   is   critical   of   neo-­‐‑Darwinian  
evolutionary  biology.  Neo-­‐‑Darwinism  (or  the  modern  evolutionary  synthesis),  
in  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   view,   is   guilty   of   both   ultra-­‐‑mechanism   and   finalism   (if  
indeed  these  are  things  to  be  guilty  of).  In  this  position  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  follows  
Bergson.  Although  he  does  not  go  into  any  great  detail  about  these  criticisms,  
we   can   extrapolate   from   the   positive   assessment   of   developmental   biology  
that   the   epistemological   model   of   the   Neo-­‐‑Darwinists   does   not   adequately  
take   into  account   the   findings  of  developmental  biology.  One  of   the  reasons  
that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   provides   for   this   in   his  Nature   lectures   is   reiterated   by  
                                                
10  “Biology  shrinks  back  from  making  its  anti-­‐‑mechanistic  revolution,  forgetting  that  
the  overthrowing  of  the  mechanistic  framework  of  physics  has  been  made  necessary  
by  some  facts:  Michelson’s  experiment—Planck’s  experiment”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  
p.  245).        
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contemporary  proponents  of  an  “extended  evolutionary  synthesis”  (EES):  the  
transformation   of   evolutionary   theory   by   the   introduction   of   statistics   and  
population  genetics  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  p.  252;  Depew  and  Weber  1995,  pp.  
10-­‐‑11).  This  criticism  echoes,  avant  la  lettre,  those  lodged  by  the  proponents  of  
the  (EES)  against  the  defenders  of  the  “modern”  or  “new  synthesis”  (MS):    
  
In  our  view,  the  MS  [modern  synthesis]  was  founded  on  tenants  that,  
while  useful  heuristics  for  advancing  biological  theory  at  the  time,  are  
now  known   to  be  anachronistic.  These   tenants   include   the   legitimacy  
of   neglecting   developmental   processes   thereby   allowing   evolution   to  
be  studied  by  population  genetics  alone  and  a  focus  on  a  single  level  of  
ultimate   causation.   These   tenants   fail   to   fully   address   biological  
organisation,  and  the  EES  arose  precisely  in  response  tot  his  deficiency.  
(Mesoudi  et  al.,  2013)    
  
In   the   very   rough   published   notes   on   evolution   and   phylogeny   from   his  
Nature   lectures,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  attempts   to   furnish  almost  a   list  of  examples  
of   the   incompleteness   of   the   MS.   To   put   this   otherwise,   his   notes   seem  
oriented   toward  undermining   the   two   theses   that   sit  at   the  heart  of   the  MS,  
especially   the   second:   “The   first   thesis   is   that   overwhelmingly   the   most  
important   cause   of   the   adaptation   of   organisms   to   their   environment,   or  
conditions  of   life,   is   natural   selection.  This   is   the  heart   of   the  Darwinism   in  
Neo-­‐‑Darwinism.  The   second   thesis   is   that   inheritance,   at   least   as   far   as   it   is  
relevant  to  evolution,  is  exclusively  mediated  by  nuclear  DNA”  (Dupré  2012,  
p.  144).    
  
In   the   remainder   of   this   paper,   I  will   look   at   two   aspects   of   the   EES,   niche  
construction,  cultural  niche  construction  in  particular,  and  multi-­‐‑dimensional  
inheritance   pertaining   to   instinct.   I   choose   these   two   because   they   coincide  
well   with   the   criticisms   that   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   makes   of   Neo-­‐‑Darwinism   and  
correlate  with   remarks   that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  makes   about   the   intertwining   of  
nature  and  culture  and  with  his  discussion  of  Lorenz’s  concept  of  “imprinting”  
(Prägung).   My   hope   in   drawing   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   often   vague   remarks   and  
notes   on   these  matters   into   conversation  with   contemporary   philosophy   of  
biology   is   not   simply   to   argue   for   a   kind   of   empirical   vindication   or  
verification   of   what   was   earlier   mere   speculation.   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   also  
supported  his  claims  with  the  results  of  empirical  study.  The  introduction  of  
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molecular  biology  into  the  story  in  the  recent  literature  on  the  EES  cannot  be  
said   to   suddenly   corroborate   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   earlier   claims,   although   it   is  
indeed   a   further   support   of   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   earlier   criticisms   of   Neo-­‐‑
Darwinism  and  his  attempt  towards  an  expanded  ontology  of  nature.  Rather  
my   aim   here   is   to   argue   that   the   inflationary   philosophy   of   nature,   the  
insistence  on  reconsidering  the  relations  between  the  “realist-­‐‑causal”  and  the  
“idealist-­‐‑motivational”  dimensions  of  being   to   the  extent  of   collapsing   them  
could  in  fact  show  the  way  toward  an  ontology  of  nature  that  is  adequate  to  
the   findings   which   have   led   to   the   EES.11  This   also   seems   to   have   been  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  aim.  In  his  notes  he  criticises  both  Darwinism  and  Idealism  
as  correct   in   their  objections   to  one  another:  “Darwinism   is   right   to  say   that  
the  problem  is  not  first  to  explain  why  this,  that  we  must  show  that  the  rest  is  
eliminated   […]   Idealism   is   right   to   say   that   the   actual   is   not,   like   a   unique  
plane,   without   relief,   sufficient.”   The   positive   content   in   Darwinism   for  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   is   that   is   recognises   “a   fecundity   of   life   from  which   there   is  
only   pruning,   a   chance   that   uses   everything.”12  The   challenge   for   a   new  
ontology   will   be   to   “place   something   in   between   chance   and   the   idea,”  
between   Darwinism   and   idealism.   This   something   is   behaviour   in   its  
intertwining  of   latent   and  actual   content:   “the   suturing  of   organism–milieu,  
organism–organism.”      
  
Both   niche   construction   and   the   analysis   of   instinct   and   the   genetic  
assimilation   of   learned   behaviour   as   aspects   of   the   EES   lead   to   a  
reconsideration   of   the   relations   between   “realist-­‐‑causal”   and   “idealist-­‐‑
constituting”  orders  of  being,   insofar  as  both  phenomena  are   illustrations  of  
the   integration   of   sense-­‐‑structures   –   i.e.   “institutions,”   a   term   that   replaces  
                                                
11  See,  “They  [Darwinism  and  idealism]  are  right  against  each  other”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  
2003  p.  251).    
12  “—but   it   [Darwinism]   supposes   a   fecundity   of   life   on   the   basis   of  which   all   that  
remains  is  to  prune,  a  chance  that  utilizes  everything”  [mais  il  se  donne  une  fecondité  de  
la   vie   à   partir   de   quoi   il   n’y   a   qu’à   élaguer,   un   hazard   qui   utilise   tout].  My   translation  
differs   significantly   from  Robert  Vallier’s   (ibid.),  which   translates   élaguer   as  unfurl,  
not   prune.   “Prune”   is   more   fitting   with   the   idea   of   evolution   as   a   process   of  
individuation.   It   also   sits   better   with   the   remarks   that   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   makes   just  
previously   concerning  Bergson’s   and  vitalism’s   attempts   to   think   the   emergence  of  
another   dimension   into   the   horizontal   or   actual   order.   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   ontology  
seems  to  work  the  other  way.  The  actual  or  horizontal  order  is  an  abstraction  from  a  
process   of   individuation,   hence   his   appreciation   for   the   idealist   critique   against  
Darwinism.  (Cf.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  1995,  p.  317).  
This MS has been accepted for publication in Discipline Filosofiche for publication in 2015. Please cite from published version. 
 15 
“constitution”   in  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   thought   –   into   evolutionary   processes.   In  
the  final  section  of  the  paper  I  will  offer  a  sketch  of  how  these  aspects  of  the  
EES   could   be   ontologically   grounded   in   the   new   ontology   that   Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s   project   was   endeavouring   toward.   If   the   EES   is   in   need   of   an  
ontological  grounding,  the  new  ontology,  with  its  emphasis  on  evolution  (as  
putting  the  fabric  of  being  into  question)  is  in  need  of  an  evolutionary  biology,  
if  the  EES  can  go  some  way  in  providing  this  we  will  be  better  able  to  arrive  at  
an  understanding  of  the  contours  and  dimensions  of  this  new  ontology.      
      
2.2  Niche  Construction  
  
In   the   rather   coarse   outline   of   niche   construction   theory   that   follows,   I  will  
rely  largely  upon  the  work  done  by  Kevin  Laland,  John  Odling  Smee,  Marcus  
Feldman,  and  Sean  Myles,  who  have  co-­‐‑authored  some  of  the  most  important  
research   in   the   field.   Niche-­‐‑construction   is   broadly   understood   as:   “the  
process   whereby   organisms,   through   their   metabolism,   their   activities,   and  
their   choices,   modify   their   own   and/or   each   other’s   niches.”   A   niche   is  
defined  as  the  “sum  of  all   the  selective  pressures  to  which  the  population  is  
exposed”   (Odling-­‐‑Smee   et   al.   2003,   p.   419).13  The   area   of   niche   construction  
that   I   am  most   interested   in   for   the  purposes  of   this  paper   is   cultural  niche  
construction,  wherein   the  niche  modifications  occur  as   the   result  of   cultural  
constructions.14  Using  evidence  provided  by  mathematical  modelling,  Laland,  
Odling-­‐‑Smee   and   Myles   argue   that      “niche   construction   due   to   cultural  
processes  can  be  even  more  potent  than  niche  construction  due  to  other  (gene-­‐‑
based)   non-­‐‑cultural   processes”   with   resulting   effects   on   evolutionary  
processes  and  outcomes  (Laland  et  al.  2010,  p.  140).    
  
What   I  want   to   argue  here   is   simply   that   cultural  niche   construction   theory  
and   gene-­‐‑culture   interaction   show   that   intersubjectively   constituted   sense-­‐‑
structures  enter  the  evolutionary  processes  of  populations  as  operative  factors  
in   those  processes  by   impacting  upon  or  structuring  selection  pressures  and  
selective  environments.  The  outline  of  the  argument  made  by  Laland  et  al.  is  
                                                
13  Okasha   (2005)   objects   to   this   broad   definition   of   niche-­‐‑construction,   preferring  
instead  a  narrower  definition  wherein  niche-­‐‑construction  is  limited  to  an  organism’s  
modification  of  its  own,  or  its  population’s  niche.    
14  Culture   is   defined   here   as   “information   that   is   capable   of   affecting   individuals’  
behaviour,   which   they   acquire   from   other   individuals   through   teaching,   imitation  
and  other  forms  of  social  learning”  (Richerson  and  Boyd  2005,  p.  5).  
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that   cultural   practices,   which   consist   of   ideal   cultural   objects,   alter   the  
environment  of  the  population  in  which  the  practice  has  emerged.  In  doing  so,  
the  cultural  objects/practices  exert  an  influence  on  selective  pressures  within  
the   cultural   environment.   In   this   way   the   cultural   objects/practices   imprint  
themselves   into   an   evolutionary   process   that   impacts   the   phenotypes   of  
subsequent   generations,   in   some   cases   making   the   population   more  
phenotypically  amenable  to  certain  cultural  practices.    
  
The  best-­‐‑documented  example  is  the  practice  of  dairy  farming.  The  argument  
here   is   that   counter   to   the   idea   that   dairy   farming   is   more   prevalent   in  
geographical  areas  with  a  higher  prevalence  for  lactose  tolerance,  the  practice  
of   dairy   farming   exerted   selective   pressure   on   the   population,   leading   to   a  
higher   frequency   of   alleles   for   lactose   tolerance   (Laland   et   al.   2010,   p.   145).  
Due   to   the   robustness   and   reliability   of   transmission   of   cultural   objects  
several   theoretical   biologists   have   postulated   that   there   is   good   reason   to  
suspect  that  cultural  niche-­‐‑construction  has  been  not  just  a  general  feature  of  
human   evolution,   but   “could   be   the   dominant   mode   of   human   evolution”  
(see,  Laland  et  al.  2010,  p.  137;  also  Laland  et  al.  2008).    
  
Niche-­‐‑construction   offers   strong   arguments   in   favour   of   the  
intertwining   of   sense-­‐‑structures   and   biological   mechanism   in   evolutionary  
processes.   I   believe   that   it   does   so   to   an   extent   that   any   effort   to   think   the  
processes  of  human  evolution  at  least  outside  the  context  of  this  intertwining  
of  culture  and  biological  mechanism  is  an  abstraction.  As  Okasha  points  out,  
this  abstraction  may  have  been  necessary   to  establish   the  modern  synthesis,  
but   it   is   can   no   longer   be   justified   insofar   as   it   leaves   out   a   significant  
dimension  of  evolutionary  reality  (Okasha  2005,  p.  1).  But  to  stop  at  the  fuzzy  
contours   of   culture   is   to   repeat   this   earlier  misstep.   Culture   does   not   seem  
limited  to  humans,  and  it  seems  question  begging  to  draw  an  arbitrary  line  in  
terms   of   where   within   the   domain   of   life   sense-­‐‑constitution   in   a   manner  
relevant   to   evolutionary   processes   (as   niche-­‐‑construction   postulates)   first  
emerges.  Prima  facie  it  seems  difficult  to  say  that  sense  would  not  go  all  the  
way  down  so   to   speak,   i.e.  why  all  niche   construction   insofar  as   it   entails   a  
behavioural   “suture”   between   organism   and   milieu   and   organism   and  
organism   does   not   implicate   sense-­‐‑constitution.   Organisms   participate   in  
niche-­‐‑construction  (alteration  of  the  selective  pressures  in  their  environment)  
through   behavioural   interaction   between   one   another   and   with   their  
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environments.   Behaviour   must   be   parsed   through   meaningful   relations  
irreducible   to   reflex   mechanism.   This   applies   not   only   to   the   cultural  
constructs   of   humans   and   higher   mammals,   but   rather   to   all   behaviour.  
Sense-­‐‑structures   in   this   fashion   enter   into   and   modulate   evolutionary  
processes.  This  line  of  argument  rests  on  the  premise  that  organismic  relations  
with   the   selective   environment   (including,   perhaps  most   importantly,   other  
organisms)  are  meaningful  and  not  reducible  without  abstraction  to  physical  
or  chemical  explanation;  an  argument  that  we  find  in  von  Uexküll,  Goldstein,  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  and  Canguilhem,  as  we  saw  in  the  previous  sections.            
  
2.3  The  Institution  of  an  Instinct  
  
In  order  to  shore  up  this  premise,  I  turn  to  the  account  of  the  relation  between  
instinct,   learned   behaviour   and   evolution.   For   the   sake   of   efficiency,   I   will  
compare  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  discussion  of  Lorenz’s  instinct  theory  in  the  Nature  
lectures  and  the  lectures  on  Institution  and  Passivity,  with  critiques  of  Lorenz  
that  were  contemporary  with  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  study  and  also  the  evaluation  
of  instinct  and  the  genetic  assimilation  of  learned  behaviour  within  Jablonka  
and  Lamb’s  account  of  extended  evolutionary  theory  in  their  Evolution  in  Four  
Dimensions  (2005).    
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   analysis   of   Lorenz’s   results   pivots   unsurprisingly   on   the  
three   interlinked   concepts   of   behaviour,   latency   and   style.   The   idea   of   an  
institution  of   an   instinct,  which  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  puts   forward   in   the   lectures  
on   institution,   is   already   somewhat   heretical   even   to   the   position   he   put  
forward   in   the   introduction   to   his   first   course   on   the   concept   of   Nature   in  
1956-­‐‑57.  Nature,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  writes,   “is  what   has  meaning,  without   this  
meaning  being  posited  by  thought:  it  is  the  auto-­‐‑production  of  meaning.  […]  
Nature   is   the   primordial,   that   is   the   unconstructed,   the   noninstituted”  
(Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  pp.  3-­‐‑4).  But  the  discussion  of  “institution  in  life”  and  of  
instinct   as   an   instance   of   institution   tells   us   that   he   was   already   thinking  
about   institution   qua   meaning   formation   outside   of   subjective   sense  
formation   (thought),   or   that   we   must   give   thought   a   very   wide   berth.15  In  
                                                
15  Cf.  “Observing  a  squid  meeting  a  predator:   the  recoil  movement,  agitation  of   the  
tentacles,   the   jet   of   ink,   the   taking   advantage   of   the   few   seconds   given   by   the  
blindness  of  the  attacker  to  escape  and  find  a  hiding  place,  honestly,  would  we  not  
call  this  thought”  (Prochaintz  1997,  p.  159,  my  translation  –  DM)  
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other  words,  institution  was  on  its  way  to  becoming  a  central  facet,  insofar  as  
the   concept   interacts   with   both   latency   and   behaviour,   of   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  
philosophy  of  nature  and  indeed  his  ontology.  Put  simply,  an  institution  is  a  
sense-­‐‑development  that  individuates  a  style  of  behaviour  such  that  it  orients  
the  modulation  of   that   style;   future  developments   refer  back   to   a  history  of  
institutional  modulation.  What  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  analysis  of  Lorenz’s   studies  
of   instinct   is   meant   to   show   is   the   extent   to   which   an   instinct   cannot   be  
thought   of   as   innate   or   pre-­‐‑existing   its   institution   in   a   behavioural  
development:   there   is  no  pure   innateness  –  no  pure   instinct   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  
2001,  p.  49).  What  Jablonka  and  Lamb’s  analysis,  which  builds  on  criticisms  of  
Lorenz  contemporary  to  both  him  and  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  demonstrates  not  only  
supports  this  thesis,  but  also  shows  how  a  learned  behaviour  or  institution  in  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   terms   is   integrated   into   evolutionary   process,   something  
Lorenz  rules  out.          
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  reading  of  Lorenz’s  concept  of  “imprinting”  (Prägung)  
emphasizes   the   dimension   of   latency   present   in   even   instinctive   behaviour  
and  criticizes  any  attempt  to  separate  the  organism  or  even  the  species  from  
“the   confluence   of   an   internal   and   external   assembly,”   what   he   called  
elsewhere   the   “suture”   between   organism   and   environment   –   both   of   these  
phrasings  are  question  begging  insofar  as  they  presuppose  what  it  is  that  they  
are  meant   to   bring   into   question,   i.e.   the   ontologically   discrete   organism.   It  
would  be  better  in  this  instance  to  qualify  that  the  organism  is  not  a  priori  but  
premised  or  antecedent  upon  relations  within  an  environment  from  which  an  
“internal”  and  an  “external”  are   consequent,   and  hence  an  organism  with  a  
functional   territory   can   be   posited.   The   aim   of  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   analysis   of  
Lorenz  is  to  demonstrate  that  even  what  we  call  instinct  is  not  a  innate  fixed  
response  on  the  part  of  an  organism  to  certain  pre-­‐‑determined  environmental  
stimuli,   but   rather   part   of   a   meaningful   set   of   symbolic   relations   that   is  
formative  of  –  institutes  –  the  organism  as  a  level  within  an  ecological  context.      
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  is  attracted  to  Lorenz’s  analyses  for  both  methodological  and  
ontological   reasons,   which   intermingle.   Firstly   Lorenz’s   insistence   on   the  
importance   of   in   situ   observation   of   animal   behaviour   over   and   above  
laboratory  experimentation  fits  with  the  general  phenomenological  approach  
that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  took  to  the  sciences  (as  discussed  in  the  beginning  of  this  
paper).   Second,   Lorenz’s   understanding   of   behaviour   as   a   morphological  
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character   of   an   organism,   akin   to   a   physical   organ   holds   with   Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s  behavioural  approach  to  phenomena  and  to  the  analysis  of  behaviour  
in   terms   of   meaningful   relations   not   causal,   physical   mechanism   –   a   point  
which  he  emphasizes  in  his  reading  of  Lorenz:  instinct  as  a  modality  of  suture  
between  organism  and  environment  displays  a  structural  flexibility  that  belies  
both   mechanism   and   idealism   (that   the   species   has   an   essence).   As   a  
morphological   character,   instinctual   behaviour   could   be   in   some   cases   the  
means   for  distinguishing  species   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  p.  190).  Finally,   even  
Lorenz’s   neurological   reductionism,   which   was   not   a   reduction   to   causal  
mechanism,  aligned  with  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  research  programme.  As  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty  was  attempting  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  study  of  nature  writ  large,  Lorenz’s  study  
of  instinct  attempted  to  steer  a  path  between  “purposivists  (‘vitalists’)  and  the  
reflex   theorists   (‘mechanists’)”   (Griffith   2004).   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   does   not  
mention  Lorenz’s  strict  distinction  between  instinct  and  acquired  behaviour,  
brought  into  question  already  in  the  1950s  through  reference  to  evolutionary  
theory.   I   do   not   think   that   this   is   commensurate   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  
proposed  ontology  and  its  exclusion  from  mention  may  be  part  of  his  (rather  
frustrating)   pick   and   mix   approach   to   dealing   with   other   philosophers.  
Lorenz’s  distinction  might  also  serve  a  methodological  purpose  of  its  own  for  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   insofar   as   it   separates   learning   and   instinct   but   retains   the  
concept  of  sense  or  symbolism  as  primary  in  the  sphere  of  instinct.    
  
At  the  core  of  the  analysis  lie  two  ideas:  (1)  that  an  instinct  is  “without  object”  
(objektlos)  and  (2)  not  mechanical  or  reflex  response  to  external  stimuli.  Rather,  
an   instinct   is   the   “manifestation   of   a   certain   (species   specific)   style”   of  
behaviour,   which   is   why   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   says   elsewhere   that   species  
themselves  are  styles.  To  say  that  an  instinct  is  without  an  object  is  not  to  say  
that   instinctual   behaviour   does   not   for   the   most   part   have   “defined  
constellations   of   external   excitants”   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   2003,   p.   192).   But   this  
does   not   mean   that   the   relation   between   environmental   stimulus   and  
behaviour   is   determined.   Environmental   cues   “actualize   a   certain   style   of  
behaviour,”  i.e.  triggers  bring  forms  of  behaviour  latent  in  the  morphological  
characteristics  of  the  organism  to  manifestation.  The  trigger,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  is  
careful  to  point  out,  is  not  a  cause  but  “evocative  of  an  innate  complex.”  The  
use  of  the  term  innate  –  inborn  orientation  toward  specific  forms  of  complex  
behaviour   –   here   indicates   that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   still   grants   an   epistemic   and  
ontological   priority   to   the   organism   as   an   ontological   level   of   explanation.  
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From   this   follows   the   claim   that   the  organism  has   in   its   form   (morphology)  
latent   patterns   of   behaviour   that   “meet   up  with”   affordances   in   the  milieu  
which  draw  the  latent  content  to  manifestation.  In  this  sense,  instincts  do  not  
have   goals   (which   would   make   them   object   directed)   but   are   pleasurable  
activities,   if   they  can  be  said   to  have  an  aim   it   is   satisfaction,  an   idea  which  
echoes  Deleuze’s  notion  of  instinct  from  his  1955  essay  Instinct  et  Institution,  a  
piece   concurrent   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   own   bringing   the   two   terms   into  
conversation  with  one  another  in  his  1954-­‐‑55  lectures.16    
  
If   the   relation   between   the   environmental   constellation   that   functions   as  
trigger   and   the   manifest   style   of   behaviour   is   not   reflexive/mechanical,  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   is   clear   that   it   should   be   understood   “symbolically”   –   the  
trigger  is  an  “idea”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  is  following  Ruyer  here).  The  behaviour—
trigger  relation  does  not  admit  to  mechanical  analysis  because  it  is  too  flexible.  
There   is   no   one-­‐‑to-­‐‑one   causal   relation   between   stimulus   and   response,   but  
rather   a   meaningful   and   formal   relation   in   the   incitement   of   one   style   by  
another.  The  flexibility  of  instinct  is  attested  to  in  the  fact  that  no  exactness  –  
although   instinctive   behaviours   do   rely   on   “complex   and   highly   specific  
environmental   cues”   (Griffith   2004,   p   611)   –   is   necessary   from   the  
environmental  stimulus.  If  a  certain  perceptual  aspect  of  the  trigger  is  absent  
it   can   be   compensated   for   by   the   exaggeration   of   another.   This   is   what  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   (and   Lorenz)   believed   Tinbergen’s   “supranormal   stimuli”  
Herring  Gull  chick  experiments  to  show.17          
  
                                                
16  See,  Deleuze   (1955);  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  describes   instinct   as   “a   tension   that  wants   to  
find  relief  without  knowing  why,   it  does  not  aim  so  much  at   the  real  as   the   irreal”  
(Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  p.  193).  
17  Tinbergen   used   props   that   did   not   resemble   a   mother’s   beak   but   contained  
exaggerated   characteristics   that   would   also   be   found   on   a   real   beak   to   stimulate  
instinctive   behaviour   in   Gull   chicks.   See,   Tinbergen   (1953).   Tinbergen   and   Lorenz  
used  these  findings  to  develop  a  theory  of  “fixed  action  pattern”  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  
discusses   in   some   detail   in   his   lectures   as   “stereotype”   behaviours.   “Fixed   action  
pattern”  denotes  a  species  specific  and  largely  invariant  action  that  is  almost  always  
carried   through   to   completion.   Tinbergen’s   experiments   purported   to   show   that  
these  patterns  could  be  elicited  by  non-­‐‑exact  stimuli  (models).  The  concept  of  “fixed  
action   pattern”   is   now   largely   abandoned   in   biology   and   ethology.   But   the  
corresponding  concept  of  superstimuli  is  still  used  in  evolutionary  social  science  (see  
de  Block  and  de  Laing  2010)    
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The   flexibility   and   symbolic   character   of   instinct   is   further   attested   to,   for  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   by   Lorenz’s   theory   of   “imprinting”   (Prägung). 18   Lorenz’s  
theory  of   imprinting  was  derived  from  observations   that  young  geese  when  
exposed   at   a   particular   stage   of   development   not   to   their   mother   but   to  
another   object,   in   this   case   Lorenz   himself,   would   imprint   upon   the   new  
object   the   signification   that   would   normally   hold   for   the   mother.   Hence  
Lorenz’s  goslings  would  follow  him  around  as  if  he  were  their  mother.  As  the  
theory  goes,   there   is  no  operative  “as   if”   in  the  relation.  The  meaning  of   the  
mother   had   been   imprinted   on   Lorenz.   For   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   these   findings  
demonstrated   that   the   object   of   the   innate   scheme   was   not   “foreseen”   by  
nature.   Its  sense  was  acquired  as  an   institution,  which  then   individuated,   in  
the  sense  of  constrained,  the  development  of  the  relations  the  bird  could  have  
with   other   animals.   Lorenz   observed   that   animals   that   became   fixated   on  
other   species   lost   their   interest   in   their   own.   This   too   was   important   for  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty:   the   sense   construction   that  was   instituted   in   the   imprinting  
was  not  specific  to  an  individual,  but  rather  to  a  species.  This  linked  with  the  
other   point   of   agreement   between   the   two,   that   species  were   to   be   defined  
phenomenologically   in   terms   of   manifest   styles   of   behaviour.   The   species  
appeared  “in  filigree”  in  the  behaviour  of  the  animal.  The  instinct  in  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s   reading   then   became   an   “empty”   schema,   which   was   filled   by   the  
institution;   for   him   this   confirmed   that   “[w]ith   empty   activity,   instinct   is  
going   to   be   capable   of   being   derailed   or   is   going   to   pass   from   instinctive  
activity  to  symbolic  activity”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  2003,  p.  195).  The  instinctual   life  
of  the  animal,   far  from  being  a  life  of  specific   inborn  mechanisms  is  a   life  of  
meaningful   relations   between   the   animal   and   its   environment,   and   most  
importantly,  other  organisms  as  parts  of  the  environment.    
  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   does   not  mention   the   terms   “innate   releasing  mechanism  or  
“fixed  action  pattern”,   though  he  does  make  note  of   the   “mechanist   side  of  
Lorenz’s  thought”  attributing  it  to  the  Tinbergen’s  influence.  He  also  uses  the  
expression   “stereotype,”   a   possible   synonym   for   “fixed   action   pattern,”   in  
noting  that  the  instinctive  behaviour  is  not  fixed  in  relation  to  an  object,  but  is  
“an   attempt   to   resolve   an   endogenous   tension”   –   an   understanding   that   he  
                                                
18  The   phenomenon   that   Lorenz   describes   with   this   term   was   first   described   and  
analysed  by  English   biologist  Douglas   Spalding.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   seems  not   to   have  
been  familiar  with  this,  although  J.L.  Haldane,  who  was  highly  critical  of  Lorenz  on  
both  political  and  biological  grounds,  reprinted  Spalding’s  article  in  1954.      
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borrows  from  Freud’s  theory  of  drives.  The  “innate  releasing  mechanism  and  
“fixed  action  pattern”  are   two  moments  of   the   instinctive   response,   the   first  
being   an   innate   system  within   the   animal   that   responds   to   a   stimulus,   the  
second   a   pre-­‐‑determined   and   fixed   behavioural   response.   Both   are  
endogenous  to  the  organism.  Both  concepts  have  also  since  been  abandoned  
in   contemporary   ethology.   The   conceptual   coupling   was   also   part   of   the  
mechanistic  side  to  Lorenz’s  thought  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  sought  to  underplay.  
In  fact  his  analysis  seems  to  straightforwardly  contradict  these  concepts.  The  
instinctual  response  is  a  latent  style  of  behaviour  that  is  evoked,  not  caused,  
by  a  trigger  which  rather  than  being  the  stimulus  for  a  mechanical  response  is  
an  “idea,”  the  trigger  is  itself  a  style  or  watermark  in  the  environment,  hence  
the  possibility  of  imprinting.  And  finally  the  instinctive  behaviour  displays  at  
its  core  no  pre-­‐‑determination  in  a  strict  sense:  “instinct  is  constituted  rather  as  
a   systemic   elaboration   of   the   world   than   as   a   reference   to   an   entirely  
constituted   exterior   world.”   The   similarity   of   instinctive   behaviour   across  
conspecifics  does  not  indicate  only  a  common  biological  causal  mechanism  of  
instinct,   but   a   shared   style   of   behaviour   that   is  what   constitutes   the   species  
(phenomenologically).  This  also  gives  us  reason  not  to  lean  toward  a  finalist  
interpretation  of   the   rejection  of  mechanism   in   instinct.  There   is  no   spirit  of  
the   species.   Rather   the   species   should   be   construed   in   terms   of   a   dialogue  
between   organism   and   environment   which   takes   on   a   specific   style.  
Behavioural   rituals  are  not   there  because   they  allow   for  a   selection  between  
animals  of  the  same  species,  this  would  be  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse;  the  
ritual,  in  part,  is  constitutive  of  the  species.  The  meaningful  relations  that  an  
animal   has,   at   the   level   of   instinct,   with   its   environment   (including   other  
animals)   allow   us   to   speak   of   an   “animal   culture.”  We   don’t   arrive   at   this  
concept  of  culture  by  derivation  or  deduction  from  human  culture:  activities  x,  
y,   and   z,   resemble   human   culture   and   so  we   can   deduce   that   animals   also  
have   culture.   Instinct   is   proto-­‐‑culture.   The   concepts   of   latency,   style   and  
expressive  behaviour  that  mark  the  analyses  of  “higher  forms”  of  culture  are  
through  and  through  natural  concepts.  The  analysis  of  instinct  is  indicative  of  
what  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  is  attempting  to  show  in  all  of  these  lectures:  reduction  
of  nature   to   idea  or  mechanism   impoverishes  our  ontology  and   forces  us   to  
turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  phenomena.  What  instinct  makes  manifest  is  a  “third  
order”   of   being,   which   is   in   fact   the   first   order   of   being,   from   which   the  
causal-­‐‑mechanist  and  motivational-­‐‑idealist  orders  are  but  abstractions.    
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Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  ends  the  section  on  Lorenz  with  a  comment  that  he  makes  in  
several   lectures   during   this   period:   the   overall   aim   of   his   investigations   is  
φύύσις  –  λόόγος  –  history.   It   is  curious  then  that  he  makes  no  note  of   the  fact  
that  his   insistence   that  Lorenz’s  analysis  of   instinct  allows  us   to  “speak   in  a  
valid   way   of   an   animal   culture”   seems   to   directly   contradict   Lorenz’s  
insistence  on   the   separation  of   learned  and   instinctive  behaviour,   that   there  
are   “neither   ontogenetic   nor   phylogenetic   transitions   between   innate   and  
learned   components   of   behaviour,”   a   distinction   rooted   in   the   conceptual  
coupling  of   innate  releasing  mechanism  and  fixed  action  pattern,  but  also  in  
his   training   in   morphology.19  It   is   possible   that   this   omission   is   the   result  
simply   of   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   pick   and   mix   approach   to   dealing   with   other  
philosophers  (we  must  also  take  into  account  that  these  are  lecture  notes  not  
published  pieces).  But   it   could  also  have   something   to  do  with   the   fact   that  
Lorenz   considered   instincts   to   be   morphological   traits   that   were  
“[conservative]   morphological   characters   in   the   course   of   evolution.”20  This  
behavioural   approach   to   species   taxonomy   accords   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  
own   vague   articulation   of  what   a   species   is:   a   style   of   behaviour.   Lorenz’s  
rigid  separation  of   instinct  and  learned  behaviour  (culture)  might  have  also,  
paradoxically,   suited  and  supported  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  attempt   to  argue   for  a  
symbolic   life   of   the   organism   from   the   bottom   up,   so   to   speak.   Lorenz’s  
isolation   of   learning   from   instinct,   his   denial   that   they   could   ever   be  
homologous,  did  not   in   this   circumstance  have   to  be   read  as  an   isolation  of  
sense   or   symbolic   life   from   organic   function   –   although   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  
reading   likely   is   against   the   grain   of   Lorenz’s   intentions.   The   point   is   that  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  philosophy  of   nature   (as   a  way   into   ontology)   clearly  held  
that  the  symbolic  life  of  the  organism  could  be  traced  from  language,  learning  
and   communication,   through   instinct   and   back   into   embryological  
morphogenesis.   Just   as   Okasha   argues   that   an   artificial   level   of   abstraction  
might   have   been   necessary   to   establish   some   of   the   basic   concepts   of  
evolutionary   biology,   so   too   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   may   have   argued   that   Lorenz’s  
                                                
19  On   the   relation  between  Lorenz’s   background   in  morphology   and  his   concept   of  
instinct   see,   Brigandt   (2005);   and   “The   feature   of   Lorenz’s   instinct   concept   that  
distinguished   him   most   clearly   from   his   predecessors,   and   from   almost   all   his  
contemporaries,   was   his   firm   and   repeated   denial   that   there   are   any   gradual  
transitions  between  instinctive  and  ‘intelligent’  (learnt,  flexible,  variable)  behaviours,  
either  in  the  development  of  an  individual  or  in  the  evolution  of  a  lineage”  (Griffiths  
2004,  p.  612).  
20  See  Lorenz  (1996)  as  cited  in  Griffiths,  (2004,  p.  627).    
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distinction   was   necessary   to   illustrate   the   symbolic   life   of   the   organism  
outside  of  learned  behaviour.  Nowhere,  to  my  knowledge,  does  he  make  this  
argument.          
  
In   the   years   surrounding   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   lectures   Lorenz’s   analysis   of  
instinct  was   being   criticized,  most   notably   by   the  British,  Marxist   biologists  
J.B.S.   Haldane   and   Helen   Spurway,   as   well   as   the   American   Daniel   S.  
Lehraman.   Following   Lehraman’s   critique,   Tinbergen   also   abandoned   the  
idea  of  “innate  behaviour”,  referring  to  it  as  “heuristically  harmful.”  From  the  
perspective  of  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   reading,   it   is  curious   that   the  attacks  against  
the   rigid   distinction   between   learned   and   innate   behaviour,   attacks   that  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  work  would  seem  to  support,  were  made  on  the  basis  of  the  
modern   synthesis   (MS),   which   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   attacks   in   his   lectures.   The  
omission  is  made  all  the  more  curious  by  the  fact  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  refers  to  
Haldane  in  his  analysis  of  Lorenz  and  that  Haldane  and  Spurway’s  critique  of  
Lorenz   and   argument   in   favour   of   the   genetic   assimilation   of   learned  
behaviour   and  hence   against   the   strict   separation   of   the   learned   and   innate  
behaviour   seems   much   more   in   line   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   own   research  
programme   than   Lorenz’s   cleavage   of   the   two.   In   the   article   referenced   by  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   Haldane   does   not   discuss   the   disagreement   in   detail,   but  
certainly   alludes   to   it   (Haldane   1953,   p.   64).  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   cites  Haldane’s  
use  of  the  terms  “mimetic  exaggeration”  and  “ritualization,”  concepts  general  
enough  not  to  necessitate  the  reference  unless  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  wanted  to  draw  
attention  to  Haldane’s  use  of  them.      
  
Haldane’s  discussion  in  the  article  cited  by  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  concerns  the  form  
of   communication   used   by   bees.   Haldane’s   argument   is   that   a   direct  
comparison  can  be  made  between  the  symbolic  behaviour  of  bees,  specifically  
in   dances   uses   to   communicate   the   location   of   and   effort   required   to   reach  
honey  or  pollen  at  a  distance  of  greater  than  seventy-­‐‑five  meters  from  the  hive,  
and   human   ritual   activity.   Thus   Haldane   argues   for   thinking   the   symbolic  
behaviour   of   humans   and   that   of   animals   as   a   continuum.   But   he   is   also  
careful  to  not  posit  intention  in  the  bees’  communication:  “I  assume  it  to  be  an  
unjustifiable  anthropomorphism  to  assume  either  that  X  [the  dancing  bee]  has  
the  intention  of  informing  Y  [the  dance  watching  bee],  or  that  Y  has  a  purpose  
to   fly   to  a   certain   locality”   (Haldane  1953,  p.  67).  Rather   the  communicative  
dance   of   the   bee   is   an   “intention   movement”:   a   prediction   of   future  
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movements,   the  ritual  dance   is  a   ritual  preparation   for   the  next   flight  of   the  
bees,  not  a  recounting  of  the  last.  Nor  is  it  a  purposive  action  in  the  sense  of  
intending  to  “bring  about  a   future  state  of  affairs  which  can  be   imagined  or  
envisioned  by  its  performer,  or  to  prevent  such  a  state  affairs”  (Haldane  1953,  
p.  63).  Haldane’s  discussion  of  ritual   is   important   in  the  context  of  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty’s   understanding   of   instinct   and   more   generally   of   nature   in   that   it  
argues  for  symbolic  activity  in  nature  outside  of  the  scope  of  purposiveness,  
and   furthermore   places   human   symbolic   behaviour   in   a   continuum   with  
other  forms  of  sense-­‐‑making  in  nature.    
  
Haldane   and   Spurway   argued   for   the   assimilation   of   learned   symbolic  
activity   into   genetic   evolutionary   processes.   Haldane   jibed   Lorenz   in   this  
regard  not  for  ignoring  evolutionary  theory,  only  the  past  thirty  years  of  it.  In  
their   account   of   the   extended-­‐‑evolutionary   synthesis   Jablonka   and   Lamb  
provide  a  contemporary  account  of  genetic  assimilation  of  learned  behaviour  
(Jablonka  and  Lamb  2005,  pp.  289-­‐‑292).  Using  the  example  of  birdsong,  they  
present   a   scenario   wherein   sexual   selection   for   a   learned   behavioural   trait  
coupled  with  an  environment  where  the  same  trait  increases  vulnerability  to  
predators   will   create   an   adaptive   advantage   for   individuals   better  
predisposed   to   learning   the   trait   with   speed   and   minimal   practice.   Where  
beautiful  songs  are  sexually  advantageous,  but  also  expose  the  singing  birds  
to   greater   risk   predators,   those   animals   that   need   to   waste   the   least   time  
learning   and   practicing   will   have   a   selective   advantage.   Over   successive  
generations   the   genetic   propensity   for   rapid   uptake   of   the   advantageous  
learned  trait  will  be  selectively  honed  to  the  point  where  the  animal  presents  
a  style   (in  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   terms)  such   that   learning   the  behaviour  requires  
minimal   environmental   cues   or   input.   In   such   situations,   the   learned  
behaviour,   or   the   requisite   phenotypic   style   –   in   the   sense   of   orientation   or  
openness  toward  the  acquisition  of  certain  kinds  of  sense  structures  –  is  said  
to  be  genetically  assimilated.  The  environmental  cues  are  still  necessary,  but  
the  bird  has  been  evolutionary  stylised  for  an  affinity  toward  certain  forms  of  
communication  (specific  songs).  
  
Here,  I  think  that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  notion  of  style,  so  important  to  his  analysis  
of   instinct,   helps   to   clarify   the   sense   in   which   a   meaning   structure   is  
genetically   assimilated   and   phenotypically   expressed   over   subsequent  
generations.   The   assimilation   is   here   again   a   matter   of   the   suture   between  
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environment  and  organism.  Some  cue  is  necessary  for  the  general  style  of  an  
organism  to  be  individuated  in  terms  of  the  specific  symbolic  activity  that  the  
style  opens  onto;  and  if   the  behaviour  ceases  to  present  an  advantage  to  the  
animal   it   will   in   theory   be   gradually   unassimilated   (if   for   example   the  
predatory  threat  vanishes,  giving  an  advantage  to  birds  who  take  more  time  
to   perfect   their   songs).   Haldane’s   account   of   ritual   communication   and   the  
corresponding   theory   of   genetic   assimilation   postulate   one   way   in   which  
sense-­‐‑structures  –  institutions  –  can  be  assimilated  or  perhaps  intertwined  is  




The   two   examples   of   “extended”   evolutionary   processes   –   cultural   niche  
construction   and   genetic   assimilation   of   learned   behaviour   –   that   I   have  
outlined  here  in  relation  to  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  philosophy  of  nature  both  point  
to   an   inflationary   conception   of   evolutionary   process,   i.e.   a   process   that  
cannot  be  characterized  purely  in  terms  of  physical  mechanism  coupled  with  
selective  processes.  Both  of  these  examples  indicate  the  importance  of  “whole  
organism”  relations  between  organism  and  environment  in  the  constitution  of  
evolutionary  process,  without  any  break  with  other  forms  of  causation.  Both  
also  point  to  the  central  role  of  sense-­‐‑structures  or  institutions  in  evolutionary  
process.  The  EES  points  us   toward   the   collapsing  of   the   abstract  distinction  
between   the   realist-­‐‑causal   and   idealist-­‐‑instituting   orders   of   being.      To  
paraphrase  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  a  scalar  structure  of  evolutionary  processes  allows  
for  the  integration  of  sense-­‐‑formation  into  biological  process  without  any  break  
with  chemical,   thermodynamic  and  cybernetic  causation.  We  see  here   the  coming  
together   of   two   ideas,   one   which   marks   the   beginning   of   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  
venture  into  ontology  and  the  second  which  marks  its  premature  cut-­‐‑off.  The  
first  is  that  the  way  into  ontology  is  through  the  relations  between  mind  and  
body,   an   idea   for  which  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   credits  Maine   de   Biran;   the   second  
that   opening  up   evolution   beyond  mechanism  and   finalism  brings   the   very  
fabric  of  being   into  question.   In  between  these   two  markers,   the  concepts  of  
style,  latency,  institution,  concepts  which  methodologically  find  their  origins  
on   the  mind  side  of   the  mind-­‐‑body  problem  start   to  manifest   themselves   in  
the   findings   of   developmental   biology,   showing   that   ontologically   it   is   the  
individuation  of  these  concepts,  or  better  the  fields  that  these  concepts  name  
that  form  the  mind-­‐‑body  problem  in  the  first  place.  The  mind-­‐‑body  problem  
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shows   the  way   into   ontology,   but   the   study   of   behaviour,   revelatory   of   the  
concepts  of  style,   latency,  institution,  shows  that  the  mind-­‐‑body  relation  is  a  
consequent,   itself   an   individuation   in   an   evolutionary   history   of   being   that  
developmental   and   evolutionary   biology   are   beginning   to   uncover   as   they  
rethink   the   conceptual   basis   of   the   neo-­‐‑Darwinian   modern   synthesis,   but  
which  they  still,  to  some  extent  lack  the  conceptual  resources  to  characterize,  
precisely  due  to  a  sedimentation  of  the  mind-­‐‑body  problem  in  contemporary  
ontology.   Having   seen   this   dynamic,   the   project   that   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   was  
engaged  in  at  the  time  of  his  death  could  well  be  characterized  as  an  attempt  
to  furnish  and  develop  these  concepts.        
  
A   “scalar   structure   of   reality”   that   allows   for   assimilation   or   enveloping   of  
processes  of   sense-­‐‑formation   and  development   into   evolutionary  ones,  does  
not   however   fully   address   the   question   of   the   constitution   of   “‘organo-­‐‑
formative’  territories  which  impinge  on  one  another  and  possess  a  periphery  
beyond  their  focal  region”  and  which  posits  individual  organisms  and  species  
as  “traps  for   fluctuation.”  The  further  elaboration  of   these  highly  suggestive  
ideas  is  certainly  the  next  and  will  be  the  most  challenging  stage  in  continuing  
the  project  of  a  philosophy  of  nature   that  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  sets  out   in  his   last  
lectures.  Perhaps  the  most  suggestive  idea  here  is  that  we  give  up  the  idea  of  
discrete   organisms   as   having   ontological   priority,   even   while   proceeding  
methodologically  from  a  behavioural  analysis  of  the  organism.  This  paradox  
is  perhaps  maintainable  if  we  replace  our  thinking  of  discrete  organisms  with  
thinking   about      “territories”   that   exert   formative   power   both   spatially   and  
temporally   –   as   I   think   both   the   analyses   of   niche   construction   and  
instinct/genetic   assimilation   of   learned   behaviour   shows.   Such   territories  
would  manifest  structural  stability  within  an  ecosystem  of  powers  qua  flows  
of  latency.  But  the  stability  of  a  territory  as  a  structurally  stable  configuration  
of   flows   of   latency   is   not   static;   precisely   the   opposite:   here   we   grasp   the  
meaning   of   thinking   structural   stabilities   as   “traps   for   fluctuation.”   The  
structural   stability   provides   precisely   the   background   against   which  
fluctuation  can  be  perceived.  The  idea  of  organo-­‐‑formative  territories  helps  us  
to   move   from   a   biological   ontology   of   entities,   to   one   of   nested   ecologies,  
where   scales  must   be   thought   in   terms   of   time   as  well   as   space,  where   the  
non-­‐‑exhaustion   of   the   antecedent   power   in   the   ecological   dynamics   gives  
temporal  depth  to  what  I  have  called  flows  of  latency.  For  those  interested  in  
pursuing   the   project   of   a   philosophy   of   nature   that   is   sketched   out   so  
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suggestively   in  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   last   texts,   and   that   is,   I   think,   also   brought  
into   clearer   focus   in   relation   and   confrontation   with   evolutionary   theory   –  
which  brings   the  very   fabric  of  being   into  question  –   these   concepts  are   the  
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